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INTRODUCTION
Between 1999 and 2013, more than 18,400 infants were successfully
delivered via gestational surrogacy in the United States.1 Gestational
surrogacy, or a surrogacy agreement in which all of the genetic material
originates from people other than the surrogate, is becoming increasingly
popular.2 Commercial surrogacy is a gestational surrogacy arrangement in
which the surrogate is paid a fee beyond compensation for medical bills
during their pregnancy.3 Altruistic surrogacy, or surrogacy in which the
surrogate is not paid a fee beyond compensation for medical bills, is also
used in the United States.4 As technology improves, so does the number of
infants born to surrogates; 3,432 were born in 2013 compared to just 727 in
1999.5 There is no federal surrogacy regulation in the United States, and
1. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, KEY FINDINGS: USE OF
GESTATIONAL CARRIERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/art/keyfindings/gestational-carriers.html (indicating substantial growth over the last two
decades in surrogacy births as gestational science improves) [hereinafter Key Findings]).
2. See ALEX FINKELSTEIN ET AL., SURROGACY LAW AND POLICY IN THE U.S.: A
NATIONAL CONVERSATION INFORMED BY GLOBAL LAWMAKING, COLUM. L. SCH.
SEXUALITY & GENDER L. CLINIC 5 (2016) (distinguishing between “traditional”
surrogacy, where the surrogate is a biological parent, and “gestational” surrogacy, where
a surrogate carries other people’s genetic material).
3. See id. at 3, 5 (arguing that LGBTQ+ persons’ parenting desires need to be
balanced with surrogates’ rights).
4. See id. at 4-5 (analyzing the proposed New York statute that would allow
commercial surrogacy).
5. See KEY FINDINGS, supra note 1 (acknowledging the recent increase of
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states vary on whether surrogacy contracts are legal.6 There is a broad
spectrum of surrogacy regulations across states; though the vast majority of
states allow commercial surrogacy, many regulate who may engage in
surrogacy and under what conditions, while two states ban it completely.7
Florida and Illinois, generally considered “surrogate-friendly” states, have
statutes that only allow commercial surrogacy in cases where the intended
parent cannot carry the child to term for medical reasons.8 Section 742.15 in
Florida’s statute (hereafter “Florida statute”) is gendered, specifying that the
intended mother must have some medical need to use a surrogate.9 Illinois
Statute 47/20 (hereinafter “Illinois statute”) is gender-neutral but still
requires the parent to have a medical need for a commercial surrogacy
contract to be enforceable.10 By enforcing a medical need requirement, these
state statutes unconstitutionally infringe upon an individual’s right to
procreate.11 In the wake of Skinner v. Oklahoma (hereinafter Skinner) and
Obergefell v. Hodges (hereinafter Obergefell), it is unconstitutional for state
surrogacy statutes to deny persons the right to procreate based on a lack of
medical need because it effectively restricts the right of LGBTQ+ people,
whether single or as a couple, to procreate.12
This Comment will argue that gender-specific statutes unconstitutionally
limit the right to procreate for non-female people and same-sex couples.13
surrogates used for assisted reproduction).
6. See Intended Parents Surrogacy Laws by State, SURROGATE.COM,
https://surrogate.com/intended-parents/surrogacy-laws-and-legal-information/
surrogacy-laws-by-state/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) (emphasizing that the lack of
federal regulation makes surrogacy law confusing).
7. See id. (distinguishing between states that are “surrogacy friendly,” from those
that are not).
8. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (stating in gender-inclusive terms that a
medical need is required for a valid surrogate contract); see also FLA. STAT. § 742.15
(1993) (stating in gender-specific terms that the intended mother must have a medical
need for a valid surrogate contract).
9. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (emphasizing that a “commissioning mother” must not
be able to carry the pregnancy to term because the gestation will harm her health).
10. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (requiring an intended parent – “he, she,
or they” – to have a physician’s affidavit).
11. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (enforcing the right to
marry and all enshrined rights for same-sex couples); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942) (incorporating the right to procreate under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
12. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (holding that same-sex couples are entitled to
right to marriage and its benefits); see also Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (holding that any
limit on the right to procreate must undergo strict scrutiny).
13. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536 (explaining that the right to procreation is
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Part I provides an overview of the variations in surrogacy law across the
United States and a brief history of surrogacy contract litigation.14 Part I also
provides an overview of Supreme Court cases that speak to the various
fundamental rights attributed to marriage and the right to procreate.15 Part II
argues that under Skinner, both the Florida and Illinois statutes are
unconstitutional because they limit the right to procreate for LBGTQ+
people.16 Part II further argues that the right of LGBTQ+ people to procreate
via a surrogacy contract was reaffirmed under Obergefell as a right
encompassed in the fundamental right to marry.17 As such, the Florida and
Illinois statutes are unconstitutional under Obergefell because they limit this
right which is guaranteed to all married couples, no matter their gender.18
Part II will also discuss In re Gestational Agreement, where the Supreme
Court of Utah in August 2019 reaffirmed the United States Supreme Court’s
Obergefell rulings, thus showing the movement of the states toward inclusive
surrogacy law.19 Part III will conclude that the Florida and Illinois statutes
are unconstitutional under Skinner and Obergefell.20
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Variations in U.S. Surrogacy Law
As reproductive science improves, surrogacy grows in popularity in the
fundamental to the survival of the human race).
14. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (recognizing the differences imposed on
LGBTQ+ people when laws deny same-sex marriage).
15. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (ensuring the right to marry for all people
regardless of sexual orientation); see also Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678,
684-85 (1977) (protecting the right of autonomous childbearing decisions), Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (combining parts of the Bill of Rights in a
penumbral right to privacy in intimate relations).
16. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (mandating that the right to procreate is a
fundamental right that requires strict scrutiny).
17. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2585 (emphasizing that the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses together protect the liberty interest found in the right to marry for all
people).
18. See id. at 2599 (arguing that the right to marry is fundamental because it includes
other fundamental rights such as the right to procreate and make autonomous decisions
in childrearing).
19. See In re Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, 449 P.3d 69, 78, 80, 84 (Utah
2019) (overturning a Utah statute with a gendered medical need requirement).
20. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (ruling that the right to marry includes the
right to procreate and applies to same-sex couples and different-sex couples equally); see
also Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (stating the importance of strict scrutiny of procreationlimiting laws to ensure there is no discrimination).
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United States.21 Surrogacy is especially appealing to LGBTQ+ people and
couples, who make up about 4.5 percent of the United States population.22
The United States is growing in popularity as a destination for surrogacy
tourism as well, a phenomenon in which an infertile person or couple forms
a contract with a surrogate in another country to carry a child to term.23 Other
popular destinations for surrogacy, like India and Nepal, have recently
banned commercial surrogacy, leaving few options for those in need of a
surrogate.24 These bans frequently lead people to contract with a surrogate
on the black market.25 The United States offers a legal alternative for
international surrogate-seekers.26
Despite the growing popularity, the legal surrogacy landscape in the
United States is varied; there is no one uniform federal regulatory structure
and each state’s regulations differ.27 Commercial surrogacy, the practice in
21. See KEY FINDINGS, supra note 1 (noting the significant increase in births via
gestational surrogacy over the last two decades).
22. See LGBT DEMOGRAPHIC DATA INTERACTIVE, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, UCLA
SCHOOL OF LAW (2019), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/visualization/ lgbtstats/?topic=LGBT#density (showing that on average, members of the LGBTQ+
community make up only 4.5 percent of state populations with D.C. as an outlier at 9.8
percent); see also Surrogate, About Surrogacy: Gay Surrogacy – Surrogacy for LGBT
Couples, https://surrogate.com/about-surrogacy/types-of-surrogacy/can-lgbt-couplespursue-surrogacy/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (explaining that surrogacy provides
LGBTQ+ people with the ability to have biological children).
23. Tamar Lewin, Coming to U.S. for Baby, and Womb to Carry It, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/us/foreign-couples-heading-to-americafor-surrogate-pregnancies.html (describing the influx of surrogacy tourism into the
United States).
24. See Nepal Joins India and Thailand in Commercial Surrogacy Ban, CONCEIVE
ABILITIES (June 17, 2016), https://www.conceiveabilities.com/about/blog/nepal-joinsindia-and-thailand-in-commercial-surrogacy-ban (discussing recent bans on commercial
surrogacy in the international community).
25. See Ian Johnson & Cao Li, China Experiences a Booming Underground Market
in
Surrogate
Motherhood,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
3,
2014,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/03/world/asia/china-experiences-a-booming-blackmarket-in-child-surrogacy.html (uncovering the surrogacy black market in China, where
embryos are implanted in a surrogacy-friendly country).
26. See Tamar Lewin, Coming to U.S. for Baby, and Womb to Carry It, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/us/foreign-couples-heading-toamerica-for-surrogate-pregnancies.html (explaining that some parents wish the child to
have citizenship from their country of origin, while some wish their child to be born in
the U.S. and receive American citizenship).
27. See Gestational Surrogacy Law Across the United States, CREATIVE FAMILY
CONNECTIONS (2016), https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-lawmap/ (alerting potential commissioning parents to the various pitfalls in each state and
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which the surrogate is paid a fee beyond compensation for medical bills, is
widely debated amongst the states.28 All states allow altruistic surrogacy, or
surrogacy in which the surrogate mother is not paid a fee beyond
compensation for medical bills, but differ on the limits and requirements for
engaging a surrogate.29 For clarity, gestational surrogacy and traditional
surrogacy are distinct, and both can be commercial or altruistic agreements.30
Gestational surrogates carry a fetus created from the egg of a donor or a
contracting person.31 A traditional surrogate provides the egg. Both
gestational and traditional surrogates carry a fetus that is not their biological
child.32
As surrogacy becomes commonplace, state regulations are evolving as
well.33 For example, In re Baby M, decided in 1988, instigated the first major
wave of regulatory court cases and legislation across the country.34 The case
involved a traditional surrogate breaking her surrogacy contract, arguing that
she had a constitutional right to contact her biological child.35 The court
ruled that commercial surrogacy contracts, or exchanging money for
surrogacy beyond medical expenses, were void as a matter of law and against
public policy.36

urging them to obtain legal representation when engaging in a surrogacy agreement).
28. See Alex Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that the line between “reasonable
expenses” and “payment for services” is constantly being redrawn by courts).
29. See id. (explaining that altruistic surrogacy is sometimes referred to as
“uncompensated surrogacy” and commercial surrogacy as “compensated surrogacy”).
30. See id. (noting that gestational surrogacy, or “full surrogacy,” requires the
assisted reproductive technology).
31. See id. (clarifying that traditional surrogacy, or “partial surrogacy,” is an
arrangement in which the surrogate provides the genetic material necessary to conceive
the child).
32. See KEY FINDINGS, supra note 1 (noting that gestational carrier cycles were more
likely to result in pregnancy and live births in comparison to non-gestational carrier
cycles).
33. See Diane S. Hinson & Maureen McBrien, Surrogacy Across American, 32
FAMILY ADVOCAT. 32, 34 (2011), https://creativefamilyconnections.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/SurrogacyAcrossAmerica.pdf?x20128 (separating states into
“red light,” “proceed at your own risk,” “squeeze into the statutory box,” and “green
light” groups).
34. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988) (holding surrogate contracts
invalid as a matter of law and policy).
35. See id. (arguing that public policy mandates a child should receive nurturing
from both natural parents).
36. See id. (assuming that the money exchanged was essentially for buying the child
from the biological mother, not for contracting her services as a surrogate).
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Arizona was the first state to ban surrogacy contracts as a matter of public
policy following the decision.37 Michigan, New York, and the District of
Columbia followed close behind.38 While states like New York enforce the
ban on commercial surrogacy with a fine, D.C.’s 1993 ban made it a criminal
offense punishable by imprisonment.39 In 2017, D.C. repealed the 1993 ban
and replaced it with surrogacy-friendly legislation.40
Unlike D.C. and Arizona, California’s Supreme Court ruled in favor of
enforcing surrogacy contracts in Johnson v. Calvert.41 In 1993, the Calverts,
a married cisgender, hetero-presenting couple, sued for the parental rights of
their biological child after the contracted gestational surrogate tried to claim
parental rights for herself.42 The California Supreme Court upheld the
agreement in favor of the intended parents, using the parties’ intent at the
time the contract was created as a basis for the decision.43
Today, five states–New York, Michigan, Louisiana, Arizona, and
Indiana–completely ban commercial surrogacy.44 The remaining forty-five
states vary in what they allow, from states with no regulations whatsoever
37. See Hinson & McBrien, supra note 33, at 32 (showing the wave of anti-surrogacy
legislation that swept the country post-Baby M).
38. See id. (explaining that Michigan and D.C. criminalized commercial surrogacy).
39. See id. at 34 (explaining that D.C. was the only jurisdiction with no surrogacy
because it was illegal for attorneys to assist).
40. See Michael Alison Chandler, With New Surrogacy Law, D.C. Joins
Jurisdictions That Are Making It Easier for Gay and Infertile Couples to Start Families,
WASH. POST (June 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/withnew-surrogacy-law-dc-joins-jurisdictions-that-are-making-it-easier-for-gay-andinfertile-couples-to-start-families/2017/06/03/845c90d4-3c99-11e7-885421f359183e8c_story.html (celebrating D.C.’s reversal of surrogacy criminalization).
41. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d, 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (granting the intended
parents sole custody because their intent when making the agreement was to become the
parents of the child, while the surrogate’s intent was not).
42. See id. (stating that the surrogate, Anna, threatened to keep the child if the
payment balance was not given to her); see also LGBTQ+ Definitions, Trans Student
Educational Resources (2019), http://www.transstudent.org/definitions (defining
“cisgender” as people that identify with their assigned gender and “presenting” as the
physical manifestation of gender identity).
43. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781-82 (reasoning that the historical common law
approach equates gestation with genetic relationship, which is not always the case).
44. See Gestational Surrogacy Law Across the United States, Creative Family
Connections (2016), https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-lawmap/ (citing the states that still enforce laws making it illegal for surrogates to be paid
beyond medical fees); but see Vivian Wang, Battle Over Paid Surrogacy in New York
Pits Progressives Against Feminists, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2019 at A17 (recognizing the
New York movement toward legalization of commercial surrogacy).
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(like Oregon) to states that essentially require a trial before allowing a prebirth order.45 Most states with legislation pertaining specifically to
gestational surrogacy contracts model their statutes from Article 8 of the
Uniform Parentage Act (hereafter “Article 8”), an optional regulation for
genetic and gestational surrogacy agreements.46 Article 8 lays out
regulations for surrogacy agreements, requiring safeguards such as allowing
traditional surrogates to withdraw consent within seventy-two hours of
transferring the child, with the goal of protecting surrogates’ rights.47 Article
8 has been through several iterations since its initial inception; most recently,
the Uniform Law Commission revised the gendered 2002 version in 2017 to
adopt gender-neutral phrasing and remove the marriage requirement.48
Despite Article 8 and states’ movement toward legalizing commercial
surrogacy, there is still uncertainty for many couples hoping for a surrogacy
agreement.49 Florida and Illinois both allow commercial surrogacy, but are
key examples of states with statutes that create uncertainty for LGBTQ+
couples seeking a commercial surrogacy agreement.50
Florida’s statute is distinguishable from the Illinois statute as it is facially
gender-specific; Illinois’s statute is facially gender-neutral.51 In Florida, the
statute requires:
(a) The commissioning mother cannot physically gestate a pregnancy to
45. See generally Mary P. Byrn & Steven H. Snyder, The Use of Prebirth Parentage
Orders in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L. Q. 633, 634 (Fall 2005) (defining “prebirth orders” as parentage orders that formally declare that the intended parents will be
the legal parents of the child upon its birth).
46. See Uniform Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Art. 8 (2017)
(providing states with a framework for regulating surrogacy in their own statutes).
47. See id. § 814(a)(2) (2017) (allowing a seventy-two-hour window after birth for
a surrogate to withdraw consent without liability).
48. See Uniform Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Art. 8 § 801(b) (2002)
(requiring that “the man and the woman” who are the intended parents both be parties to
the gestational agreement); see generally Amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act as
Last Amended in 2002 With Prefatory Note and Comments, 37 FAM. L. Q. 5, 30
(requiring marriage to engage a surrogate).
49. See Gestational Surrogacy Law Across the United States, CREATIVE FAMILY
CONNECTIONS (2016), https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-lawmap/ (noting that how surrogacy laws are written is not always how they are practiced).
50. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (1993) (allowing commercial surrogacy on its face but
restricting LGBTQ+ people from surrogacy via statutory phrasing); see also 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (allowing commercial surrogacy through gender-neutral
phrasing but requiring a medical need requirement).
51. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2)(a)-(b) (1993) (using the gendered term “mother” for
surrogacy requirements); see also 750ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (using “he, she, or
they” for nongendered surrogacy requirements).
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term;
(b) the gestation will cause a risk to the physical health of the
commissioning mother; or
(c) the gestation will cause a risk to the health of the fetus.52

The Florida statute specifies “mother” as the individual required to have a
medical need for a surrogate.53 This gendered term limits surrogacy
contracts to cisgender, hetero-presenting couples because it does not include
men.54 Although the phrase “cannot physically gestate a pregnancy to term”
could be construed to include men, the term “mother” expressly excludes
them from surrogacy contracts.55
In contrast, the Illinois statute requires:
(b) The intended parent or parents shall be deemed to have satisfied the
requirements of this Act if he, she, or they have met the following
requirements at the time the gestational surrogacy contract is executed:
(1) he, she, or they contribute at least one of the gametes resulting in a preembryo that the gestational surrogate will attempt to carry to term;
(2) he, she, or they have a medical need for the gestational surrogacy
evidenced by a qualified physicians affidavit attached to the gestational
surrogacy contract and as required by the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015.56

Illinois uses the gender-inclusive phrasing “he, she, or they” to refer to the
commissioning parent or parents.57 The statute does not expressly define
“medical need,” leaving it instead to medical practitioners to determine
whether the threshold is met.58 Both statutes similarly place a limit on who
is able to engage in a commercial surrogacy contract, regardless of the
gender pronouns used.59
52. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2)(a)-(c) (1993) (specifying that the commissioning
“mother” must have a medical need in order to legally enter into a surrogacy contract).
53. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2)(a)-(b) (phrasing the requirement with gendered
pronouns in a way that restricts access to surrogacy contracts to hetero-presenting
couples).
54. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2)(a)-(c) (excluding all people who are not
“commissioning mothers” with a medical need as defined in the statute from engaging
in a surrogacy agreement).
55. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2)(a)-(b) (restricting men or male-identifying people
from engaging a surrogate by explicitly using the gendered term “mother”).
56. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (using gender-neutral terms that would
allow men and same-sex couples to be parties in a surrogacy contract).
57. See id. (requiring a “medical need” without defining what can fulfill that
requirement, i.e. the inability to physically gestate a pregnancy).
58. See Nancy Ford, The New Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 93 ILL. B.J. 240,
245 (2005) (explaining that no state included cisgender men’s inability to become
pregnant in the definition for the medical need required by statute).
59. See generally COURTNEY G. JOSLIN ET AL., STATUTORY PROVISIONS REGARDING
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B. Constitutional Cases for Surrogacy
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
the right to due process and equal protection under the law.60 The
government may not strip a person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of the law, and all people must be protected equally.61 The Supreme
Court has incorporated the Fourteenth Amendment to protect many other
rights, including the right to procreate and the right to marriage.62 Further,
strict scrutiny is required for any law that may infringe upon a fundamental
right.63 To meet the high standard for strict scrutiny, a statute must be
narrowly tailored and support a compelling government interest.64
Skinner v. Oklahoma was the first case to discuss the constitutionality of
statutes regulating the right to procreate generally.65 In Skinner, the Court
scrutinized an Oklahoma statute that allowed the state to perform
vasectomies on defendants convicted of two or more felonies involving
moral turpitude.66 The Supreme Court ruled that there was a constitutional
right to procreate, adding it to the list of fundamental rights requiring the
judiciary to apply strict scrutiny.67 The Court held that the statute violated
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.68 Skinner also
mandated that strict scrutiny is required for any law that may infringe upon

THE PERMISSIBILITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF SURROGACY AGREEMENTS, LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 4:2 (2019) (listing statutes of the various

states regarding surrogacy).
60. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting states from making laws that limit
life, liberty, or property).
61. See id. (precluding states from enacting laws that affect people unequally).
62. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 538, 538-43 (1942)
(incorporating the right to procreate via the Fourteenth Amendment so that it cannot be
taken without due process of the law).
63. See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 687(2008) (J. Breyer, dissenting) (outlining the
requirements of strict scrutiny when ruling on cases involving fundamental rights).
64. See id. at 688 (dissenting to the proposal that strict scrutiny should be used for
gun regulation cases).
65. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538-43 (ruling the right to procreate to be a fundamental
right that requires strict scrutiny when regulated by state laws).
66. See id. (explaining that “moral turpitude” here was a felony involving robbery
but that “moral turpitude” essentially applies to all felonies, even someone who steals
twenty-dollars from a stranger).
67. See id. at 540 (holding that strict scrutiny is required to restrict the power of evil
or reckless people).
68. See id. at 538 (infringing on the fundamental right of procreation also infringes
on the right to marriage).
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the fundamental right to procreate.69
In a recent case, In re Gestational Agreement, Utah’s Supreme Court dug
deeper into the right to procreate by overturning the state’s gestational
agreement statute.70 The Court found the gendered medical need
requirement of the statute unconstitutional.71 In re Gestational Agreement
was a joint petition brought by a married same-sex couple along with the
couple’s surrogate and her husband, requesting that the court validate their
gestational agreement.72 On appeal, Utah’s Supreme Court reversed the
lower court’s decision.73 The Court reasoned that under Obergefell, the
gendered Utah statute unconstitutionally limited valid gestational surrogacy
contracts to cisgender couples.74 By specifying that the intended mother
must have a medical need for a surrogacy contract, the gendered statute
effectively barred same-sex male-identifying couples from exercising their
marital right to have children.75
Obergefell holds that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to the
“[c]onstellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage.”76 Justice
Kennedy includes contraception, childrearing, and procreation in a list of the
“most intimate” choices included in the right to marry.77 The right to make
these decisions, in addition to choosing to enter into marriage, are part of the
Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment.78 Under the Due Process
69. See id. (holding that strict scrutiny is required when looking at the infringement
of a fundamental right); see also D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 688 (2008) (J. Breyer,
dissenting) (outlining the requirements of strict scrutiny when ruling on cases involving
fundamental rights).
70. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69, 74 (Utah 2019) (overturning the
Utah statute requiring the “intended mother” have a medical need).
71. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-803(2)(b) (West 2008) (defining “medical need”
as an intended mother that is unable to bear a child without risk to her health or the
child’s).
72. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69 (Utah 2019) (explaining that there
was standing for the court to hear the case despite it not being adversarial).
73. See id. at 80 (arguing that surrogacy and the right to have children are provided
by the right to marriage).
74. See id. at 77 (holding that the Utah code conditions a valid gestational contract
on the requirement that one parent be female).
75. See id. at 79 (reasoning that the Utah code violated Obergefell by depriving
same-sex male couples the ability to be parties in valid gestational agreements).
76. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015) (referring to the multiple
rights that the Court connects to the right to marriage, including the right to procreate).
77. See id. at 2599 (concluding that same-sex couples have the right to make
decisions regarding family life in addition to the right to marry).
78. See id. at 2607 (stating that the decision to marry and raise children is based on
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, due process of law is required for a
State to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.79 Obergefell also held
that the Equal Protection Clause secures the protection of the right to marry
for all people, regardless of sexual orientation.80 Obergefell holds that
through the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the right to marry is a fundamental right guaranteed to all
people, and same-sex couples cannot be denied that right.81
Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Pavan v. Smith, a 2017 case
hinging on an Arkansas statute which mandated that a surrogate and her
husband be listed as the mother and father on a child’s birth certificate.82 The
suit was brought by two same-sex couples who conceived their children
through sperm donation.83 Leigh Jacobs and Terrah Pavan each gave birth,
but the statute barred their wives from being listed as a legal parent.84 The
Supreme Court ruled the statute unconstitutional because it denied marital
benefits to same-sex couples.85
II. ANALYSIS
A. Medical Need Requirements Are Unconstitutional Under Skinner
Because They Bar the Right to Procreate
Florida and Illinois’ statutory requirement of “medical need” in order to
engage in a valid surrogacy contract is unconstitutional and unenforceable
romantic and personal considerations).
79. See id. at 2597 (naming the fundamental liberties – life, liberty, and property –
protected by the Bill of Rights that cannot be taken by a State without due process of
law).
80. See id. at 2591 (connecting the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
and Equal Protection Clause to show that together they fully capture the protection of the
right to marry).
81. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (explaining that the right to marry is part of
the liberty interest and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
82. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017) (overturning the lower court
judgment to deny legal parentage to the same-sex spouses of the biological mothers); see
also ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(e)-(f)(1) (West 2014) (defining the terms “mother”
and “father,” as the woman who gave birth and her husband).
83. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077 (seeking a declaration that the Arkansas birth
certificate law is unconstitutional).
84. See id. (denying legal parentage to same-sex couples because the legislature
emphasized biological parentage in the statute).
85. See id. (holding the Arkansas statute unconstitutional because it denied same-sex
couples the “constellation of benefits” Obergefell guaranteed to all marriages).
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under Supreme Court precedent because it broadly limits the right to
procreate without a substantial government interest.86 Skinner supports the
argument that it is unconstitutional to block the right to procreate through the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.87 The Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits State laws from unequally infringing on people’s
rights, such as the right to procreate.88 Surrogacy contracts, therefore, are
preserved in the right to procreate established in Skinner’s holding.89
1. The Florida Statutory Requirement That a Person Must Have a
Medical Need to Before Entering into a Valid Surrogacy Contract Is
Unconstitutional Under Skinner Because It Bars a Group of People from
Their Right to Procreate.
The fundamental idea behind the Skinner holding is that procreation is a
basic human right.90 According to the Supreme Court, marriage and
procreation are fundamental rights that speak to the basic existence and
survival of our species.91 When surrogacy statutes, like Florida’s, limit the
right to procreate via surrogacy solely to a medical need, the right to
procreate is stripped from individuals that are physically healthy but are
unable to bear children for other reasons.92
Medical need requirements heavily affect same-sex couples and other
members of the LGBTQ+ community who were historically, and are
currently, plagued with legal issues surrounding the parentage and custody

86. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1993) (requiring that a commissioning
mother medically cannot carry a fetus or doing so would risk her physical health); see
also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (requiring the intended parents have a medical
need for a surrogate); see also Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 538 (1942) (protecting the right to procreate via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause).
87. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537 (holding it unconstitutional to strip someone of their
fundamental right to procreate).
88. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring states to provide equal protection
under the law for all people).
89. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (holding procreation to be a fundamental right).
90. See id. (incorporating the right to procreate under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
91. See id. (acknowledging the far-reaching effects that denying the right to
procreate has on a race or group of people).
92. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2)(a)-(c) (West 1993) (limiting valid surrogacy
contracts to only women with a medical need); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20
(a)(2)(2017) (limiting surrogacy contracts to people with a medical need, effectively
barring healthy same-sex couples and single men from procreating).
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of their children.93 The primary effect of these statutes is that they limit, or
in many cases completely bar, LGBTQ+ people from having children by
invalidating the contract formed between the intended parent(s) and the
surrogate.94 This is an unconstitutional check on the procreation rights of the
LGBTQ+ community because it affects them more acutely than it does any
other group, thus violating the Fourteenth Amendment.95 The Fourteenth
Amendment was incorporated under the Equal Protection Clause by the
Supreme Court in Skinner to include the right to procreate; therefore, every
person’s right to procreate must be equally protected under the law.96
Florida’s statute uses gendered language that limits who can procreate via
surrogacy.97 The statute unconstitutionally keeps people not in cisgender,
hetero-presenting relationships from procreating.98 The statute’s deprivation
of the LGBTQ+ community’s right to procreate as a minority group is similar
to how people of color were strategically denied their procreational right in
Skinner.99 The Supreme Court explicitly stated that the Oklahoma statute at
bar in Skinner was problematic at its core because it granted the State broad
power to grant certain individuals immunity from the practice, but then
stripped others of their right to have children.100
The Skinner Court expands further by looking to the future ramifications
of routinely depriving a group of people of the right to procreate.101
93. See Courtney G. Joslin et al., Statutory Provisions Regarding the Permissibility
and Enforceability of Surrogacy Agreements, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER FAM. L. 236, 247 (Aug. 2019) (stating problems LGBTQ+ couples face
when trying to have children, many of which are not immediately resolvable because
case law is focused on hetero-presenting relationships).
94. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69, 73 (Utah 2019) (holding that the
gendered Utah surrogacy statute unconstitutionally barred the rights of the same-sex
couple seeking to gain legal parentage of their child born from a surrogacy contract).
95. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (resolving that the right to procreate is a
Constitutional right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
96. See id. (arguing that the right to procreate is a basic human right, and therefore
is protected equally under the law).
97. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2)(a)-(b) (West 1993) (limiting the right to
procreate by not including all gender-identifying people in the statute).
98. See id. (implying that only cisgender women can participate in a surrogacy
agreement by using the term “mother” in the statute).
99. See id. (mandating that the intended mother have a physician-documented
medical need for a surrogate).
100. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (holding it unconstitutional to deprive a person of
the basic liberty of procreation).
101. See id. (arguing that depriving a group of the right to procreate can cause that
group to disappear entirely).
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Depriving a group of this right causes irreparable injury to minority groups
because it allows a dominant majority to regulate who in the minority is
allowed to procreate, potentially limiting the number of minority births.102
As a minority group, LGBTQ+ people are just as at risk of injury today at
the hands of the cisgender, hetero-presenting majority.103 The Court requires
statutes infringing on the right to procreate to undergo strict scrutiny because
of lasting, potentially devastating future effects on the LGBTQ+
community.104 Strict scrutiny is required for any law that may infringe upon
a fundamental interest, but the Florida statute is neither narrowly tailored,
nor backed by a compelling government interest.105 The statute affects all
people seeking to have children through a surrogacy contract and does not
take steps to protect surrogates–the party the state has an interest in
protecting.106
The Florida statute unconstitutionally limits members of the LGBTQ+
community from exercising the right to procreate, a fundamental right as set
out in Skinner, because it is not narrowly tailored.107 Despite the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the statute broadly prevents this
minority group from engaging a surrogate and having children.108 The
statute effectively bars all non-cisgender, hetero-presenting members of the
LGBTQ+ community from procreating by delegitimizing any efforts they
make toward having children.109 There is no narrow-tailoring: all people
102. See id. (maintaining that the ramifications cause irreparable damage to
minorities).
103. See LGBT Demographic Data Interactive, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, UCLA
School of Law (Jan. 2019), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/visualization/lgbtstats/?topic=LGBT#density (showing that LGBTQ+ people make up only 4.5 percent of
state populations on average).
104. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (invoking the Constitution’s guarantee of just and
equal laws to require strict scrutiny for State sterilization laws).
105. See D.C. v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2851 (2008) (J. Breyer, dissenting) (outlining
that strict scrutiny requires a statute to be narrowly tailored and support a compelling
government interest and pointing out the deviation from the requirements in the majority
holding).
106. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (1)-(2)(West 1993) (making no mention of
avenues for LGBTQ+ people to enter legitimate surrogacy contracts).
107. See id. (providing no statutory exceptions or alternatives for LGBTQ+ persons
to lawfully engage a surrogate); see also Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (stating that the
Constitution provides equal protection under the law and State laws cannot unequally
target minorities).
108. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2)(a)-(b)(West 1993) (specifying that “mothers”
have the medical need instead of using genderless terms or not requiring a medical need
at all).
109. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69, 73 (Utah 2019) (holding a Utah
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without uteruses are uniformly barred from engaging a surrogate, whether
single or in a same-sex relationship, because they are not cisgender women
with a medical need.110
Further, there is no reasonable government interest for the gendered
medical restriction in the Florida statute.111 Those opposed to commercial
surrogacy argue that a medical need requirement supports the state interest
in protecting surrogates from exploitation.112 This argument falls flat in
Florida because the legislature has not taken steps to institute viable
protections for surrogates, although there is a model code to support such
legislation.113
Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act is a model for states’ surrogacy
legislation, and still, Florida chose not to follow the map the Act lays out.114
Florida does not include provisions in its surrogacy statute to directly protect
surrogates during the course of an agreement, such as mandating legal aid,
bodily autonomy for the surrogate, or the ability to terminate the contract at
will.115 The statute instead focuses heavily on who is not allowed to be a
party in a gestational surrogacy contract, showing the true intentions of the
statute: to bar LGBTQ+ people from engaging a surrogate.116
Florida’s statute is sloppy regarding the safety and welfare of surrogates
when contrasted with the Uniform Parentage Act.117 The Florida statute
statute unconstitutional for broadly stopping gay men from becoming the legal parents
of their child born from a gestational surrogate).
110. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2)(a)-(b) (1993) (using a gendered term for the medical
need requirement in a way that bars same-sex couples, non-binary people, and maleidentifying people from legally engaging in a surrogacy contract).
111. See D.C. v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2851 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(requiring a narrowly-tailored provision and a compelling government interest for strict
scrutiny of laws that limit fundamental rights).
112. See Wang, supra note 44, at A17 (explaining the negative response to
commercial surrogacy legalization because of the commodification of women’s bodies).
113. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (1) (1993) (providing no protection for contracted
surrogates beyond an age limit).
114. See Uniform Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Art. 8 §§ 808(a)-(c)
(2017) (creating a model statute dedicated to ethical and inclusive surrogacy
contracting).
115. See FLA. STAT. § 742.151515 (1), (2)(a) (1993) (neglecting to statutorily require
medical or legal payments for the surrogate or regulate contract termination).
116. See id. § (2)(a)-(c)(excluding people who are not a “commissioning mother” with
a medical need and dividing them into three categories: (1) cannot physically gestate a
pregnancy, (2) the gestation causes a health risk to the mother, or (3) causes a health risk
to the fetus).
117. See Uniform Parentage Act, Art. 8 § 808(a) (requiring a surrogacy agreement
allow surrogates to make independent health decisions, including terminating the
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requires surrogates to be eighteen, but does not require contracts to include
any protections for the surrogate’s health or wellbeing.118 The Uniform
Parentage Act offers requirements that surrogates be twenty-one years old,
complete medical and mental-health evaluations, and have independent legal
representation in the contracting process.119 In comparison, the current
version of the Florida statute provides a surrogate little to no legal protection
if they enter into a contract, no matter if the intended parents have a medical
need or not.120
The Florida gestational surrogacy statute limits the right to procreate
without meeting the strict scrutiny standards Skinner requires.121 The statute
is not narrowly tailored and it bars an entire population from procreating
without stipulating any reasonable limits on the law.122 Further, the Florida
statute does not support a compelling government interest because it does
not provide any substantial legislative protections for contracted
surrogates.123 The absence of a compelling government interest and the
failure to narrowly tailor the statute unconstitutionally interferes with the
fundamental right to procreate.124
2. The Illinois Statutory Requirement That a Person Must Have a
Medical Need to Enter into a Valid Surrogacy Contract Is Unconstitutional
Under Skinner Because It Bars a Group of People from Their Right to

pregnancy).
118. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (1993) (requiring that a surrogate be eighteen before
participating in a contract, with no mention of a medical exam, psychological exam, or
legal aid).
119. See Uniform Parentage Act, Art. 8 § 808(a)-(c) (requiring surrogates and
intended parents to be twenty-one years old, to complete medical and mental-health
evaluations, and have independent legal representation).
120. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (1)-(4) (1993) (overlooking the need for contracted legal
protections for surrogates).
121. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1942)
(subjecting statutes regarding the fundamental right of procreation to strict scrutiny); see
also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (1)-(2)(b) (1993) (limiting surrogacy contracts to
“mothers” with a medical need with no measure to include LGBTQ+ people).
122. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540 (mandating that laws limiting the right to
procreation must undergo strict scrutiny).
123. See Uniform Parentage Act, Art. 8 § 808(a)-(c) (requiring surrogacy agreements
to protect surrogates’ rights and interests); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1) (West
1993) (requiring only that a person be at least eighteen years old to become a surrogate).
124. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535, 538 (designating procreation a fundamental right
protected by the Equal Protection Clause).
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Procreate Despite Its Non-Gendered Language.
The Illinois surrogacy statute unconstitutionally limits LGBTQ+ people
from procreating, against the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it requires a medical need in order to engage in a
surrogacy contract without providing an alternative for healthy LGBTQ+
individuals or couples.125 As the Court states in Skinner, statutes limiting the
right to procreate, such as the Illinois surrogacy statute, cause irreparable
injury to the people they affect.126 These statutes can cause the groups they
affect to “[w]ither and disappear.”127 Skinner acknowledged the high risk of
minority populations devastated by a statute the white majority created that
was focused on sterilizing the imprisoned.128 That risk also rings true for the
LGBTQ+ community today, who are affected by statutes created in
predominantly cisgender, hetero-presenting legislatures.129 These statutes
have dramatic and irreversible impacts on the LGBTQ+ community when
they mitigate a person’s ability to have children or claim children as their
own.130
When applied, the medical need requirement in the Illinois statute severely
limits the right to procreate for members of the LGBTQ+ community
because healthy people in same-sex couples do not meet the requirement and
may not be able to procreate without the help of a surrogate.131 The Illinois
statute utilizes gender-neutral pronouns that makes the statute seem, on its
face, inclusive.132 Yet, the statute limits the right to procreate to cisgender,
hetero-presenting couples because it requires that there be a medical need in

125. See id. (explaining that, as a basic right, the right to procreate cannot be limited
by state law in a way that disproportionately affects a minority group).
126. See id. at 541 (stating that in reckless hands, the ability to deny the right to
procreate causes damage to groups of people).
127. See id. (referring to the power dynamic between the majority white community
and minority communities of color).
128. See id. (stating that “[i]n evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which
are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear”).
129. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69, (Utah, Aug. 1, 2019)
(acknowledging that the medical requirement prevented LGBTQ+ people from engaging
a surrogate).
130. See id. at 84 (holding that barring same-sex couples from claiming legal
parentage was against the Equal Protection Clause); see also Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct.
2075, 2080 (2017) (holding that barring the mother’s same-sex spouse from being listed
on the birth certificate violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
131. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (limiting procreation for LGBTQ+
people by instituting a medical need requirement).
132. See id. (using the pronouns “he, she, or they” to refer to intended parents).
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order to legally engage a surrogate.133 The Illinois statute does not expressly
define a medical need, instead deferring to medical practitioners to decide
whether a medical need exists.134 Without a definition of medical need, the
limits of the statute are ambiguous and make the right to procreate, at best,
uncertain for LGBTQ+ people.135
As it is worded now, the Illinois statute bars healthy men, same-sex
couples, and other queer couples from engaging in a surrogacy contract.136
The statute obstructs an LGBTQ+ person’s right to procreate in a way that
leaves the same right of the cisgender, hetero-presenting majority
unscathed.137 When the statute was passed in 2005, it restricted the right to
procreate via surrogate in such a way that only cisgender, hetero-presenting
couples would be able to take advantage of the medical technology.138 The
statute’s medical need requirement makes it virtually impossible for male
members of the LGBTQ+ community to engage a surrogate for their own
procreative needs because it is unlikely a medical professional would deem
it medically necessary.139 The Illinois legislature has not fixed the statute to
remove the medical need requirement, although it amended various other
sections of the Parentage Act between 2005 and today, despite the obvious
drawbacks.140 Currently, the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because it unequally affects a specific group of
people.141
133. See id. (requiring persons wanting to commercially contract for a surrogate to
have a medical need, regardless of their gender).
134. See id. (requiring a physician’s affidavit to confirm the medical need in addition
to a mental health evaluation).
135. See Ford, supra note 58, at 245 (recognizing the unlikelihood that medical
practitioners would acknowledge having male genitalia as a legitimate medical need for
a surrogate).
136. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (restricting valid surrogacy contracts to
those with a confirmed medical need).
137. See id. (limiting surrogacy contracts to people with a uterus).
138. See Ford, supra note 58, at 245 (2005) (noting that the newly-passed Surrogacy
Act would likely not allow men, whether hetero-presenting or gay, and no matter if they
are single or in a couple, to procreate via surrogacy in Illinois).
139. See id. (stating that there is a great challenge for a same-sex couple to have
children via surrogate in Illinois and have joint parental rights under the curtain phrasing
of the statute because of the medical need requirement); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
47/20 (2017) (requiring a physician to confirm a medical need for a surrogate).
140. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (showing no substantive adjustments to
the medical need requirement since its inception in 2005).
141. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(explaining that states cannot unequally legislate away the right to procreate).
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The right to procreate is guaranteed to all people through the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.142 Under Skinner, the
Illinois statute must be narrowly tailored and further a compelling
government interest in order to meet the strict scrutiny standard.143 The
Illinois statute is not narrowly tailored because it unequally affects a broad
class of people.144 The statute serves as a barrier to any person who is not
cisgender and hetero-presenting and their right to have children.145 Although
the gender-neutral language of the statute seems inclusive, the medical
requirement still effectively bars many members of the LGBTQ+ community
from procreating because, as healthy people not in a cisgender, heteropresenting relationship, they do not have a medical need for a surrogate.146
Further, the Illinois statute is not advancing a compelling government
interest.147 The medical requirement in the Illinois statute serves no
legitimate purpose, as it does not protect surrogates and does not protect the
intended parents.148 The Illinois statute lists requirements that do serve a
legitimate purpose, such as psychological evaluations for the surrogate and
the intended parents, health insurance for the surrogate, and independent
legal counsel for both parties.149 These stipulations provide logical supports
for both parties to insure a successful surrogacy agreement, unlike a medical
requirement.150 The medical requirement does not protect the surrogate
because its only purpose is to prevent people who want to have children from

142. See id. (holding the Oklahoma legislation unconstitutional on the grounds that
procreation is fundamental for the survival of humanity).
143. See id. (explaining that State statutes regarding sterilization require strict scrutiny
because the laws can invidiously affect some groups of people).
144. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/2020 (2017) (mandating a medical need to engage
in a legitimate surrogacy contract but failing to define what a “medical need” is).
145. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (arguing that a statute cannot essentially bar a
minority from procreating because there is no opportunity for a person to regain what the
law takes from them through other means).
146. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/2020 (2017) (requiring a medical need for a
legitimate surrogacy contract, effectively cutting off the possibility for members of the
LGBTQ+ community to procreate).
147. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (requiring strict scrutiny for statutes that limit the
right to procreate).
148. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/2020 (2017) (listing requirements that protect the
interests of the surrogate and the intended parents outside of the medical requirement).
149. See id. (requiring protections for the surrogate and the intended parents for a
legal surrogacy contract).
150. See id. (creating a legitimate support system for both parties by requiring health
insurance for the surrogate and legal counsel for both parties).
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engaging in commercial surrogacy.151
Statutes with a provision requiring a medical need in order to engage in a
valid commercial surrogacy contract strips same-sex couples and other
members of the LGBTQ+ community of their right to procreate, regardless
of whether the statute contains gender-neutral language.152 Statutorily
requiring a medical need keeps physically and mentally healthy LGBTQ+
couples (two cisgender men, for example) from procreating because a doctor
could decide there is not a legitimate medical need for a surrogate.153 Barring
a person from having children is not reversible and, as noted in Skinner, the
effects of such a law last for generations.154 Like the Oklahoma statute in
Skinner, the Illinois statute blocks people from having children and causes
them to suffer irreparable damage by limiting their ability to fulfill their
desire to have children.155
B. Medical Need Requirements Are Unconstitutional Under Obergefell
Because They Deprive Same-Sex Couples of the Right to Participate
Equally in Marital Benefits.
Procreation and childrearing are among the many protected benefits
included in the right to marry that the Supreme Court held to be protected
for all people, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity.156 Supreme
Court decisions over the last several decades confirm that the Constitution
allows people the right to make decisions for themselves in their homes and
relationships without government interference.157 Gestational surrogacy
151. See Uniform Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Art. 8 § 808(a)-(c)
(providing protection for surrogates without limiting who has the right to procreate via
surrogate).
152. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (1993) (barring men from engaging in a valid surrogacy
contract because they are not the intended mother with a medical need); see also 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (barring people from engaging in a valid surrogacy contract
because they do not medically need a surrogate).
153. See Ford, supra note 58, at 245 (noting that no state included a potential father’s
inability to become pregnant in the definition of a medical need for a surrogate).
154. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (stating that the
statute in question causes irreparable injury that deprives those affected of a basic
liberty).
155. See id. (holding that depriving people of a basic liberty is unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
156. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 U.S. 2584, 2590 (2015) (holding that states cannot
bar LGBTQ+ people from the right to marry because it is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
157. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (combining aspects of
the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to create a penumbral right to privacy);
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statutes with medical requirements, like the Florida and Illinois statutes,
interfere with people’s privacy and childbearing rights because they prevent
LGBTQ+ couples from legally engaging a surrogate.158
Gendered gestational requirements, like the Florida statute, deprive
LGBTQ+ people of their rights to procreate and privacy, and are therefore
unconstitutional under Obergefell.159 Non-gendered gestational medical
requirements, like the Illinois statute, still set conditions on the benefits of
marriage that disparately affect LGBTQ+ people.160 Across the board,
medical requirements unequally rob a group of people of their right to
procreate and the other benefits included in the right to marry, and are thus
unconstitutional.161
1. The Gendered Florida Statutory Requirement That a Person Must
Have a Medical Need to Enter into a Valid Surrogacy Contract Is
Unconstitutional Under Obergefell Because It Bars LGBTQ+ Couples
from the Benefits of Marriage.
Florida’s gendered medical requirement unconstitutionally bars LGBTQ+
persons from the benefits of marriage because it does not restrict cisgender,
hetero-presenting persons in the same way.162 This differential treatment
was held unconstitutional in Obergefell, whose holding was reaffirmed in
Pavan.163 Further, it denies LGBTQ+ couples the marital rights established
in Supreme Court precedent regarding marriage and family.164 The right to
see also Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 683-85 (1977) (protecting the
right to make autonomous childbearing choices).
158. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1993) (requiring a doctor to examine the
intended mother and decide whether she has a medical need); see also 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 47/20 (2017) (requiring a doctor’s exam to determine if a person can engage a
surrogate).
159. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69, 74 (Utah 2019). (stating that state
laws that deny LGBTQ+ people the marital benefits given to cisgender couples are
unconstitutional under Obergefell).
160. See id. at 74, 78 (recognizing that it is impossible to read gendered language in
a statute as gender-neutral).
161. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 U.S. 2584, 2590 (2015) (recognizing that the right
to marriage includes numerous other benefits that cisgender, hetero-presenting people
enjoy).
162. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017) (applying Obergefell to the
gendered Arkansas statute in question).
163. See id. (affirming Obergefell and holding statutes which deny same-sex couples
the liberties afforded to cisgender couples to be unconstitutional).
164. See Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2599 (stating Supreme Court precedents for
individual autonomy in contraception, procreation, and childrearing).
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privacy in marital affairs and the right to make independent decisions on
childbearing are included in the list of fundamental marital rights.165 These
rights, given to cisgender, hetero-presenting couples without unconquerable
restrictions, cannot be taken from LGBTQ+ people without contravening the
Constitution.166
The Florida gestational surrogacy statute is clearly unconstitutional under
Obergefell because its gendered medical need requirement restricts
LGBTQ+ persons far more severely than cisgender, hetero-presenting
persons.167 While the statute harshly limits a female-identifying individual’s
ability to engage a surrogate, it completely eradicates a male-identifying
individual’s ability to engage a surrogate.168 Through this statute, Florida
has relegated the LGBTQ+ community to a lower-class life that cisgender
heterosexual people would find unendurable: married but without complete
control over their own childbearing decisions.169
Florida’s statute unconstitutionally strips half of the LGBTQ+ population
of its ability to have children by not using inclusive terminology and not
creating an avenue for LGBTQ+ people to engage a surrogate.170 It also
unconstitutionally denies same-sex couples the benefits afforded to
cisgender, hetero-presenting couples by the state against the Supreme
Court’s holding in Pavan.171
2.

The Gender-Neutral Illinois Statutory Requirement That a Person

165. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490 (1965) (forbidding overly broad
government regulations within the zone of privacy of a marriage); see also Carey v.
Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 683-85 (1977) (acknowledging that the right to
make childbearing decisions is at the heart of the penumbral right to privacy).
166. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69, 74 (Utah 2019) (noting that men
in a same-sex marriage could not meet the Utah surrogacy requirement for the “mother’s”
medical need).
167. See Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2590 (holding state statutes that treat LGBTQ+
persons differently than cisgender persons to be unconstitutional); see also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 742.15 (West 1993) (limiting valid surrogacy contracts to “mothers” with a
medical need).
168. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d at 74 (holding the gendered Utah
surrogacy statute unconstitutional because it barred the petitioners, a same-sex maleidentifying couple, from becoming the legal parents of their child).
169. See Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2601 (acknowledging the imbalance between
LGBTQ+ people and cisgender people in the ability to live one’s life the way they wish).
170. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078-79 (2017) (holding an Arkansas
requirement that only a male spouse can be on a birth certificate unconstitutional because
it treated same-sex couples differently than cisgender couples).
171. See id. (referring to the “constellation of benefits” bestowed on cisgender couples
by the state that cannot be unconstitutionally denied to LGBTQ+ people).
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Must Have a Medical Need to Enter into a Valid Surrogacy Contract Is
Unconstitutional Under Obergefell Because It Bars LGBTQ+ Couples
from the Benefits of Marriage.
Like the Florida statute, the Illinois surrogacy statute requiring intended
parents to have a medical need unconstitutionally places an unequal burden
on the shoulders of LGBTQ+ people without due process of law.172 Unlike
the Florida statute, the Illinois statute is gender-neutral and seems to be
inclusive on its face.173 Nonetheless, the medical requirement bars many
LGBTQ+ couples from procreation entirely without due process of law,
while cisgender, hetero-normative couples have access to alternative
avenues for overcoming procreation hurdles.174 As such, the statute is
unconstitutional under Obergefell, which holds that infringement of marital
rights based on sexual orientation is a violation of the Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment.175
Obergefell holds that choices concerning contraception, procreation, and
childrearing fall under the right to marry, and are thus individual and
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.176 The exclusion of samesex couples – and thereby LGBTQ+ people generally – from marriage and
the rights included in that marriage is unconstitutional.177 The gender-neutral
Illinois statute still restricts same-sex couples’ procreation choices in a way
that many hetero-presenting couples would find intolerable.178 A statute that
unequally restricts the fundamental rights of a specific group of people, like
the Illinois statute does, is unconstitutional under Obergefell.179
172. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1993) (limiting the ability of maleidentifying people to legally engage a surrogate); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20
(2017) (using gender-neutral terms to restrict the ability of LGBTQ+ people to engage a
surrogate).
173. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (using the gender-neutral terms “he, she,
or they” to describe the surrogacy statute’s medical need requirement).
174. See Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2601-02 (acknowledging that it is a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause to limit LGBTQ+ people’s marital rights when they are not
limited for others).
175. See id. at 2602 (holding it unconstitutional to create hurdles for LGBTQ+ people
that cisgender people do not face).
176. See id. at 2599 (placing the fundamental rights concerning individual intimate
choices named in prior cases under the umbrella of marital benefits).
177. See id. at 2604 (analyzing the protections of the right to marry and concluding
that same-sex couples are also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
178. See id. at 2601 (noting that same-sex couples are forced to have unstable and
uncertain personal lives when their constitutional rights to marry, procreate, and raise
children are not protected).
179. See id. (holding that state laws cannot limit LGBTQ+ marriages when
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For example, even if same-sex couples are able to become parties to a
valid surrogacy contract, they still might not be able to list both parents as
the legal guardians of the child.180 As held in Pavan, it is unconstitutional to
limit the marital rights of LGBTQ+ people in a way that cisgender, heteroidentifying people are not.181 LGBTQ+ parents in Illinois may have to go
through risky adoption proceedings with a traditional surrogate to ensure
both parents are legal guardians of their child.182 Unlike hetero-presenting
couples, same-sex couples in Illinois cannot be certain of whether they have
access to the rights the Constitution prescribes.183 This difference between
the lives of same-sex couples and hetero-presenting couples is
unconstitutional because, as stated in Obergefell, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to procreate,
regardless of sexual orientation.184
The Illinois statute also restricts LGBTQ+ procreation rights in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by denying LGBTQ+
people their liberty in making autonomous choices in marriage.185 In relation
to marital rights and the benefits included in that right, the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are bound together; if one is
infringed upon, the other is as well.186 Illinois restricts the right of LGBTQ+
people to procreate if it creates barriers to engage a surrogate without due
process of law, but does not impose the same barriers as the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to cisgender, hetero-presenting people
in the same degree.187 As such, the Illinois statute is unconstitutional because
it infringes on the marital and procreative rights of LGBTQ+ people against
heteronormative marriages are not limited the same way).
180. See Ford, supra note 58, at 245 (recognizing that to get both partners in a gay
relationship listed as a father, they would need to assume the risk for adoption in a
traditional surrogacy agreement).
181. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017) (holding that being a “parent”
on a birth certificate is a marital benefit).
182. See Ford, supra note 58, at 245 (noting that a same-sex couple, of any gender,
would have to go through adoption proceedings in order to share parental rights).
183. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078 (holding Arkansas’s surrogacy requirement
unconstitutional because it unfairly treated LGBTQ+ couples differently than cisgender
couples in accordance with Obergefell).
184. See Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2602 (holding that same-sex couples are guaranteed
the right to marry as part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment).
185. See id. at 2603 (expressing the interconnection between the liberty interests of
the Due Process Clause and the equal rights interests of the Equal Protection Clause).
186. See id. (explaining that each clause is instructive of the other).
187. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078 (affirming Obergefell by holding that statutes
preventing LGBTQ+ people from enjoying marital benefits are unconstitutional).
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the Fourteenth Amendment.188
As written, the Illinois statute is unconstitutional because it unequally
restricts the marital benefits of LGBTQ+ people in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause.189 It does not comply with the Obergefell or Pavan holdings because
it treats LGBTQ+ people differently than cisgender, hetero-presenting
people.190
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
The best argument for legislation restricting surrogacy, or banning it
entirely, is to protect surrogates from exploitation and the commodification
of human bodies.191 This argument, typically made by cisgender, heteropresenting people, fails to recognize that it is possible to both protect
surrogate interests and allow them bodily autonomy while also giving
LGBTQ+ people the ability to legally have children.192
Surrogates are certainly at risk for exploitation.193 While contracting
parents tend to be older, wealthy, more highly educated, from larger cities,
and more well-traveled, surrogates tend to be younger than the intended
parents, poorer, from a small town or suburb, and typically have no higher
education.194 The disparity between surrogates and intended parents
immediately puts surrogates at a disadvantage.195 The ethical questions of
188. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting states from infringing on the rights
to due process and equal protection of the law).
189. See Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2598 (acknowledging that the benefits and rights
encompassed in the right to marriage are rooted in history and precedent).
190. See id. at 2599 (explaining that there is a right to autonomous choice regarding
marriage and its benefits).
191. See Wang, supra note 44, at A17 (explaining the push-back against a New York
bill which would legalize commercial surrogacy in the state).
192. See Alex Finkelstein et al., Surrogacy Law and Policy in the U.S.: A National
Conversation Informed by Global Lawmaking, COLUM. L. SCH. SEXUALITY & GENDER
L. CLINIC, 40 (2016) (noting that LGBTQ+ interests can be balanced with surrogate
interests).
193. See Leslie Morgan Steiner, Who Becomes a Surrogate?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 25,
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/11/who-becomes-a-surrogate
/281596/ (explaining that American surrogates tend to be younger and poorer than the
intended parents).
194. See id. (specifying that American surrogates are 28 years old on average, tend to
make less than $60,000 a year, and typically already have two or three biological
children).
195. See Wang, supra note 44, at A17 (quoting Gloria Steinem who recently spoke
out vehemently against the New York bill to legalize commercial surrogacy, alongside
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surrogacy are debated globally, and because many countries ban surrogacy
for domestic or foreign LGBTQ+ people, LTGBQ+ people look toward the
United States to start their families.196
Although there is risk for exploitation, those risks can be substantially
mitigated by thoughtful legislation regulating the surrogacy industry.197
Arguments for banning surrogacy do not recognize the risk for illegal
surrogacy, which is certainly more likely to result in the exploitation and the
creation of hazardous conditions for the surrogate.198 Instead, regulations
can make sure surrogacy is conducted ethically and all parties are
protected.199 The Uniform Parentage Act proposes regulations protecting the
physical and mental health and safety of the surrogate.200 It states that
surrogates must have independent legal counsel of their choice and that the
agreement should provide the surrogate with the ability to make her own
health and welfare decisions, including the decision to terminate the
pregnancy.201
Surrogates, just like people generally, have the right to bodily autonomy
and to make their own decisions regarding procreation and childrearing.202
While it is not the government’s job to tell people how to carry out their
rights, it must provide protection to people’s fundamental rights guaranteed
in the Constitution.203 The government should regulate surrogacy in order to
prominent feminists).
196. See Tamar Lewin, Coming to U.S. for Baby, and Womb to Carry It, N.Y. TIMES,
(July 6, 2014), at A1 (describing the influx of foreigners into the United States for the
purpose of engaging in commercial surrogacy services).
197. See Uniform Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Art. 8 § 804(a)(8)
(2017) (providing states with a framework for regulating surrogacy to protect surrogates
and intended parents from exploitation, such as requiring each party’s rights to be
included in the agreement).
198. See Ian Johnson & Cao Li, China Experiences a Booming Underground Market
in Surrogate Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014), at A4 (uncovering the Chinese
surrogacy black market, where surrogates are sent to Thailand for embryo implantation
then flown back to China to live in secrecy until the birth).
199. See Uniform Parentage Act, Profanatory Note, (laying out main goals to protect
the interests of both the surrogate and the intended parents through well thought-out
regulations).
200. See id. Art. 8, § 804(7) (providing requirements for the intended parents and the
surrogate in order to engage in a legal surrogacy contract).
201. See id. (specifying that a legal surrogacy agreement must allow the surrogate to
make autonomous decisions regarding the health and welfare of herself and the
pregnancy).
202. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (restating the penumbra
of rights included in the right to privacy, including bodily autonomy).
203. See id. (arguing that an ability, promise, and desire to procreate is not and has

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2020

27

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3

468

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 28:3

protect surrogates’ right to bodily autonomy and to protect LGBTQ+
people’s right to procreate.204
CONCLUSION
Gender-specific statutes unconstitutionally limit the right to procreate for
non-female identifying people and same-sex couples, whether the statute is
gender-neutral or not.205 The Skinner holding demonstrates that both Florida
and Illinois set unconstitutional statutory limits on LGBTQ+ people’s right
to procreate.206 Obergefell reaffirms the right to procreate, including it as
one of the numerous rights now under the right to marry umbrella.207
As such, the Florida and Illinois statutes unconstitutionally limit the right
to procreate which is guaranteed to all married couples no matter their gender
identity or sexual orientation.208 Further, there is no reasonable government
interest in a medical requirement for commercial surrogacy agreements.209
As they are currently written, the Florida and Illinois statutes are
unconstitutional and illegal.210
In re Gestational Agreement, decided by the Supreme Court of Utah in
August 2019, reaffirms the United States Supreme Court’s Obergefell
rulings.211 The holding exemplifies the movement toward developing
surrogacy precedent that is both constitutional and inclusive of all couples.212
Along with other slowly updating state statutes, it also shows that the state
not been a prerequisite for a valid marriage in any state).
204. See id. (acknowledging the Supreme Court precedent of protecting people’s right
to make their own decisions regarding their health and wellbeing).
205. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (mandating the
right to procreate); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (ensuring the right to marry
for all people regardless of sexual orientation).
206. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540 (mandating that the right to procreate is fundamental
and therefore requires strict scrutiny if regulated by the government).
207. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (mandating the right to marry as a fundamental
right regardless of sexual orientation).
208. See id. at 2599 (arguing that the right to marry is fundamental because it includes
other fundamental rights).
209. See D.C. v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2851 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(requiring that laws infringing on fundamental rights be narrowly tailored with a
compelling government interest).
210. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (recognizing the right to procreate as protected
under the right to marry).
211. See In re Gestational Agreement, 1449 P.3d 69, 82 (Utah 2019) (overturning the
Utah surrogacy statute because it limited the right to procreate).
212. See id. (holding that LGBTQ+ couples have a constitutionally-protected right to
procreate within the right to marry).
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interest in guarding surrogates against exploitation can be protected with
truly inclusive statutes.213

213. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 20-162 (West 2019) (changing outdated
language to be gender-inclusive, allowing unmarried couples to become parents, and
permitting the use of donated embryos in surrogacy).
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